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AMBIVALENCE, ANXIETIES / ADAPTATIONS, ADVANCES: 
CONCEPTUAL HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
MARTIN CLARK* 
Scholars of the history of international law have recently begun to wonder 
whether their work is predominantly about law or history. The questions we ask 
— about materials, contexts and movements — all raise intractable problems of 
historiography. And yet despite this extensive and appropriate questioning within 
the field, and its general inclination towards theory and theorising, few scholars 
have turned to the vast expanses of historical theory to try to think through how 
we might go about addressing them.  
This article works towards remedying that gap by exploring why and how we 
might engage with historiography more deeply.  
Part One shows how the last three decades of the ‘turn to history’ can be usefully 
read as a move from ambivalence to anxiety. The major works of the 2000s 
thoroughly removed the pre-1990s ambivalence to history in general, with brief 
considerations about method. Efforts in the last decade to build on those works 
have led to the present era of anxiety about both history and method, raising 
questions around materials, contexts and movements. And yet far from a 
negative state, this moment of anxiety is both appropriate and potentially 
creative: it prompts us to rethink our mode of engaging with historiography.  
Part Two explores how this mode of engagement might proceed. It reconstructs 
the principles and debates within conceptual history around the anxieties of 
materials, contexts and movements. It then explores how these might be adapted 
to histories of international law, both generally and within one concrete project: a 
conceptual history of recognition in the writings of British jurists. Part Three 
concludes by considering the advances achieved by this kind of engagement, and 
reflects on new directions for international law and its histories. 
Keywords: international legal history, historiography, interdisciplinary 
engagements, method, Reinhart Koselleck 
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[1] Scholars of the history of international law have recently begun to wonder 
whether our work is predominantly about law or history, and, if we must make a 
choice, which discipline ought to be the main guide to our methods.1 We hold 
contradictory feelings about the purposes, limits, and meanings of history, the 
ways it can be written, and how it relates to and uses legal thought and practice.2 
We are firmly and inescapably ensconced in a variety of important questions 
about method and methodology. How should we write our histories? How should 
we deal with texts, archives, context, biography, disciplines, regions, 
geographies, periods, structures, systems, causation and change? Who should do 
the re-thinking and re-writing? And what have we missed so far, and how can we 
retrieve it?  
[2] These questions all raise intractable problems of historiography. They must be 
asked, answered, re-asked, re-answered. They will always remain ultimately 
unanswerable and unsettled. And yet despite this extensive and appropriate 
questioning within the field, and its general inclination towards theory and 
theorising, few scholars have turned to historical theory—the field that considers 
the methods and purposes of history and its writing, and philosophical questions 
about the nature of historical truth, causation, and memory, for example—to try 
to think through how we might go about addressing them. This article works 
towards remedying that gap by exploring why and how we might engage with 
historiography more deeply.  
[3] Part One addresses the ‘why’ and sets up the ‘how’. I suggest that the last three 
decades of the ‘turn to history’ can be usefully read as a move from ambivalence 
to anxiety. The major works of the 2000s ‘turn to history’ thoroughly removed 
the pre-1990s ambivalence towards histories of international law, but contained 
at most brief reflections on their historiographical commitments. More recent 
efforts to build on their legacies — both by exploring their methodological 
choices and in writing new histories — have moved us to anxieties around 
history and method in at least three areas: over materials, contexts, and 
movements. Yet far from a negative state, this moment of anxiety is an 
appropriate reaction to the complexity of doing good historical work. It is also a 
potentially creative moment. These anxieties can prompt and guide us in thinking 
about how we might engage with historical theory. 
[4] Part Two explores how this engagement might proceed. Historiography should 
not be approached as a procrustean bed of historians’ methods and criteria. Nor 
should the various schools of historical theory be treated as singular or static: 
they are internally diverse and open to debate and disagreement. Instead, 
scholars of international law ought to approach historical theory as one set of 
                                                 
1   See, eg, A. Orford, ‘International Law and the Limits of History’, in W. Werner, A. Galan 
and M. de Hoon (eds.), The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi 
(2017), 297. 
2   Two recent symposia, among other works, nod in this direction: see C. Tomlins, ‘Foreword: 
“Law As...” II, History As Interface for the Interdisciplinary Study of Law’, (2014) 4 UC 
Irvine Law Review 1; A. L. Brophy and S. Vogenauer, ‘Introducing the Future of Legal 
History: On Re-Launching the American Journal of Legal History’, (2016) 56 American 
Journal of Legal History 1. 
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materials for thinking more deeply about method. While engagement should take 
many forms and explore a range of approaches, to demonstrate how and why to 
do this, I focus on one here — conceptual history — and the ways in which it 
might be adapted to projects in international legal history. In Part Two then, I 
first explore the frames, methods and approaches of conceptual history. I then 
turn to where and how these inquiries might be adapted to histories of 
international legal concepts. I then illustrate the promise of this framing by 
considering the methodological issues raised by one project; a conceptual history 
of recognition in the writings of British jurists.  
[5] Part Three concludes by considering the advances achieved by this kind of 
engagement, and reflecting on new directions for international law and its 
histories.
I AMBIVALENCE, ANXIETIES 
[6] The usual story about the ‘turn to history’ in international law holds that with the 
end of the Cold War came a revived interest in critically re-evaluating the ideas, 
figures, structures and theories embedded in the origins of international law.3  
The arrival of a supposed consensus about liberal democratic political and 
economic systems, new international unrest and interventions, and a seeming 
return to multilateralism long prevented by superpower struggles, all offered new 
vistas for international law — and with them a renewed interested in the histories 
of international law. The milestone works of this period of international lawyers 
turning to history are well known — David Kennedy, Martti Koskenniemi, Gerry 
Simpson and Antony Anghie.4 These texts largely appeared in the 2000s, but 
they attempted to make sense of both the supposed ‘new horizons’ of the 1990s 
and the longer histories and structures of the discipline. These works also laid the 
ground for contemporary debates about historiography. Here, I read them as 
markers of a declining ambivalence not just towards history itself, but also 
towards questions of historical method. 
[7] The first historiographically-sensitive works started with texts and lives as their 
principal archives.  
[8] Kennedy sought to contextualise early canonical works — Vitoria, Suarez, 
Gentili and Grotius — by asking, simply, ‘what would one have to think to write 
this?’ and trying to find historical alternatives to traditional legal problems that 
                                                 
3   See, eg, M. Koskenniemi, ‘Why History of International Law Today’, (2004) 4 
Rechtsgeschichte 61; M. Craven, ‘Theorising the Turn to History in International Law’, in 
A. Orford and F. Hoffmann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International 
Law (2016), 23. 
4   D. Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholarship’, (1986) 27 Harvard International Law Journal 
1; M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 
1870–1960 (2001); G. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in 
the International Legal Order (2004); A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making 
of International Law (2005). 
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have neither been solved nor abandoned.5 Rather than charting the development 
of doctrine, trying to find continuities or differences with today’s writings, 
constructing a social history of these writers, or even trying to show that they 
actually held some set of views or other, Kennedy’s goal there was simply the 
‘description of texts’.6 What results is a detailed reconstruction of the works of 
four major jurists that Kennedy argues reveals their coherence and difference 
from twentieth century international law (contra the readings of those twentieth 
century ‘modern’ international lawyers). We might see Kennedy’s work now as 
itself a ‘modern’ form of chronicling, reliant on another (literary) methodology 
to cast new light on old materials by asking carefully how they speak to us today. 
Kennedy’s other works took up origin stories — of the League of Nations and 
later of the imagined nineteenth century — using the ideas of break, movement 
and repetition to make sense of how those stories spoke to the discipline in the 
1990s.7 
[9] Koskenniemi’s Gentle Civilizer significantly advanced this way of approaching 
texts and lives, based on a more direct engagement with historiography. While 
Koskenniemi recognised the importance of historiography, he remained cautious 
about not treating it as rigid or settled, but just as ‘riddled with methodological 
controversy’ as sociology, philosophy or law.8 This grounded some suggestive 
historiographical commitments that are not articulated in full at the outset. 
Koskenniemi offered small-scale social, intellectual or cultural inquiries, or a 
‘great man’ theory writ relatively small, confined to the circle of international 
lawyers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. To avoid suggesting 
that these ‘great minds’ of the era were the only important factors, Koskenniemi 
matched them with contextual and epochal elements to produce a narrative 
history of international lawyering and its ideas, which he dubbed an 
‘experimental … non-rigorous’ approach to history.9 This method aimed to 
‘bring international law down’ from precisely those ‘epochal or conceptual 
abstractions’ present in the earlier chronicles and hagiographies, and looked to 
varied, developing practices of international law to avoid singular views about 
the shape of the era. These practitioner-subjects were described ‘as actors in 
particular social dramas’ that played out on the ‘terrain of fear and ambition, 
fantasy and desire, conflict and utopia’ that was international law; where they 
expressed ‘occasionally brilliant insights and (perhaps more frequently) 
astonishing blindness, the paradoxes of their thought, their intellectual and 
                                                 
5   Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholarship’, supra note 4, at 11–13. And see D. Kennedy, ‘A 
New Stream of International Law Scholarship’, (1988) 7 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal 1, at 12ff (examining international law’s ‘history and historiography’ at a general, 
epochal level). 
6   Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholarship’, supra note 4, at 12. 
7   D. Kennedy, ‘The Move to Institutions’, (1987) 8 Cardozo Law Review 841; D. Kennedy, 
‘International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion’, (1997) Quinnipac 
Law Review 99. 
8   Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, supra note 4, at 6. 
9   Ibid 5–8. 
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emotional courage, [and] betrayals and self-betrayals’.10 The history was drama, 
specifically tragedy, which we knew was filled with noble yet doomed 
aspirations. For most readers, this mix of doctrine and drama did not lead to 
hagiographies and panegyrics, despite the obvious risks.  
[10] The second pair of milestones engaged with historiographical questions of 
structure, perspective, and wider contexts.  
[11] Anghie’s work can be read as revitalising the non-European histories of the 
1960s and 1970s, though in a much more powerful, direct way that explored 
colonialism and imperialism as structural themes intertwined with the histories of 
international law and offered more than just different or non-European 
narratives.11 Anghie’s historiographical sensitivities are refracted through the 
works of postcolonial scholars — Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha, 
David Scott and Dipesh Chakrabarty — whose influence he explicitly 
acknowledges.12 Building from their pivotal contributions that challenged 
Eurocentrism among historians,13 Anghie urged us to look to histories that were 
‘alternative’ to the narratives, concepts and ‘controlling structures’ of 
conventional histories: histories of resistance that take up the perspective of the 
peoples subjected to international law, and which are ‘sensitive’ to the tendency 
to assimilate those stories into conventional ones.14  
[12] Simpson described his approach to exploring unequal sovereigns and 
international ‘outlawry’ as ‘theoretical intellectual history with a point’.15 This 
was an episodic history of the roles played by the idea of sovereign equality in 
organising the global legal order that drew heavily on European diplomatic 
history. The episodic approach allowed Simpson to outline the occurrence and 
recurrence of legalised hegemony at different places and times, each providing a 
new angle on the enduring theme of hierarchies of states.16 Simpson and Anghie 
linked their episodes through large organising themes, charting the gaps and 
elisions in place of a continuous narrative. Like the first strain, they began with 
the writings and actions of international lawyers. But they also sought to 
ultimately address and reveal just as much about the wider contexts, institutions 
and structures beyond the discipline that also shaped history and law.  
                                                 
10   Ibid 7. 
11   See Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 4, at 7–9. See also A Anghie, ‘The Evolution of 
International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities’, (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 
739; A Anghie, ‘Vattel and Colonialism: Some Preliminary Observations’, in V. Chetail and 
P. Haggenmacher (eds.), Vattel’s International Law from a XXIst Century Perspective 
(2011), 237. 
12   Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 4, at 9 note 14. 
13   See, eg, D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (2000); P. Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
History (1993); J. L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System AD 
1250–1350 (1991). 
14   Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 4, at 8. 
15   Simpson, Great Powers, supra note 4, at 11. 
16   See further Simpson’s reflections in G. Simpson, ‘Great Powers and Outlaw States Redux’, 
(2012) 43 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 83. 
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[13] About a decade ago, Matthew Craven wrote that for Simpson international legal 
history is ‘understood primarily as a rhetoric’ about various figures — Great 
Powers, outlaw states, colonisers, pirates — not merely as background to today’s 
doctrinal questions ‘but rather a past marked by ambiguity and ambivalence, 
rhetorical excess and definitional undecidability, that finds continuing expression 
in contemporary legal and political discourse’.17 I take up this characterisation as 
a reflection of the decline in ambivalence in the way that I have used it so far: 
that by 2007, at the latest, history and historiography were a thoroughly 
important and inescapable part of understanding international law; that this past 
was now radically open for exploration; and that equally our methods for 
exploring it could and must be more creative. International legal historiography 
now embraced ambiguity, taking doctrine not as science but as rhetoric against 
the background of the indeterminacy of legal ideas, and sought the traces of the 
past in today’s arguments.  
[14] None of the works discussed above is ambivalent about historiography. Each 
author recognised a need to raise and address these questions, and to articulate 
and defend some theory and method, even if it is modestly generic (Kennedy), 
‘non-rigorous’ (Koskenniemi), aiming to have ‘a point’ (Simpson), or broadly 
reliant on and generally inspired by a large tradition that is noted but lies beneath 
the work (Anghie). With them we encounter fractured timelines, murky and 
contested narratives, figures and projects with multiple and unclear roles, 
intentions, and culpabilities, ideas in flux, diverse conditions and structures, and 
a variety of questions, sources and methods.  
————————— 
[15] With this came anxiety. Around and after these works coalesced a large body of 
new histories examining the full gambit of events, people, and ideas, written by 
international lawyers, historians, political and international relations theorists, 
                                                 
17   M. Craven, ‘Introduction: International Law and Its Histories’ in M. Craven, M. Fitzmaurice 
and M. Vogiatzi (eds.), Time, History and International Law (2007), 1, at 12. See also G. 
Simpson, ‘Piracy and the Origins of Enmity’ in M. Craven, M. Fitzmaurice and M. Vogiatzi 
(eds), Time, History and International Law (2007), 219. 
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among many others.18 The milestones became millstones; the sources against 
which the work of extending, critiquing, responding, narrowing or expanding our 
ways of doing history were processed. Looking to the immediate past decade, I 
identify three major anxieties: materials, contexts and movements — or, what the 
archive contains, how it should be placed, and how we read and construct its 
changes. Doubtless others could be described, but these are the strongest trends. 
[16] A first group of anxieties revolves around materials. What should we look at? 
Which texts and contexts, and how to read the archives we construct? The most 
recent work exploring these questions and exemplifying attempts to rethink them 
is the ‘History, Anthropology and the Archive of International Law’ project. This 
project grew out of collaborative conversations that turned to ‘heated debates’ 
about history, anthropology and law and resulted in ‘a whole series of questions 
[being] opened up, particularly regarding methodology’.19 Instead of turning to 
scholarly work on method, the authors ‘decided to try an experiment instead’: 
turning to artefacts — a letter, a graphic novel, a suit, a poster, and a memorial.20 
                                                 
18   Of the many works across these disciplines that could be included here, a basic list in 
approximate chronological order of subject might be: D. J. Bederman, International Law in 
Antiquity (2001); B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (eds.), The Roman Foundations of the 
Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire (2010); L. A. Benton, Law and 
Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900 (2002); A. Fitzmaurice, 
Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000 (2014); B. Teschke, The Myth of 1648: 
Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations (2003); R. Tuck, The 
Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to 
Kant (1999); E. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society Grotius, Colonialism and Order in 
World Politics (2002); L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (2008); E. Jouannet, 
The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of International Law (2012); L. A. Benton 
and L. Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 
1800-1850 (2016); A. Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual 
History 1842–1933 (2014); N. Berman, Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, 
Nationalism, and International Law (2012); F. A. Boyle, Foundations of World Order: The 
Legalist Approach to International Relations, 1898–1921 (1999); I. V. Hull, A Scrap of 
Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (2014); M. Garcia-
Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law (2013); U. Özsu, 
Formalizing Displacement: International Law and Population Transfers (2015); J. E. 
Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry into the History and 
Theory of International Law (2004); S. Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations 
and the Crisis of Empire (2015); Y. Otomo, Unconditional Life: The Postwar International 
Law Settlement (2016); K. Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, 
Environment, and the Safeguarding of Capital (2013); A. Orford, International Authority 
and the Responsibility to Protect (2011); S. Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: 
Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (2011); S. Moyn, The Last 
Utopia: Human Rights in History (2012). Longue durée monographs and thematic 
collections include, eg, H. Kalmo and Q. Skinner (eds.), Sovereignty in Fragments: The 
Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (2010); B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (2012); D. Armitage, Civil Wars: 
A History in Ideas (2017); S. Kadelbach, T. Kleinlein and D. Roth-Isigkeit (eds.), System, 
Order, and International Law: The Early History of International Legal Thought from 
Machiavelli to Hegel (2017); M. Koskenniemi, W. Rech and M. Jimenez Fonseca (eds.), 
International Law and Empire: Historical Explorations (2017). 
19   M. Chiam et al, ‘The History, Anthropology and the Archive of International Law Project’, 
(2017) 5 London Review of International Law 1. 
20   Ibid. 
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This project, then, seemed to take up a double rejection of both law and writing 
generally (with the possible exception of the letter),21 as well as writings on 
historical and anthropological method. This is part of a general trend in recent 
years to take up objects, commodities, literature, daily practices and lived 
experience as places where we might begin histories of international law.22 All 
of these moves are familiar to historians and general legal historians alike. But I 
suggest that they signal a dissatisfaction or anxiety about staying too reliant on 
texts and individuals alone, which is a natural attraction for lawyers (as they 
were for historians prior to the 1960s) and the basis of earlier doctrinal histories. 
The anxiety here is that text and interpretation — especially when narrowed to 
legal texts written and read by lawyers and jurists — will not uncover what is 
really going on, or will simply replicate and reinforce a preference for what is 
written, and written by lawyers.23 
[17] A second collection of anxieties respond to context, structure and perspective. 
Where and whose context is relevant for understanding legal changes? What 
kinds of structural questions — of race, gender, empire, nation — should be 
asked? Most recently, these have coalesced around the deep problem of 
Eurocentrism in international law’s history. This was most clearly illustrated in 
the critical engagements with the Oxford Handbook on the History of 
International Law’s attempts to ‘globalise’ international legal history by opening 
up new contexts, engaging with structural questions, and making perspective and 
positionality central. Criticisms of the Handbook’s aims focused largely on 
methodology and execution. Martineau, for example, contended that to achieve 
the editors’ aims of overcoming Eurocentrism, nothing less than a radical shift of 
vocabulary would be needed: the kind of method and approach that revealed 
what was hidden, instead of just presenting different stories side by side.24 
Despite its aims, the Handbook still told resoundingly European histories. In 
response, the editors suggested they never attempted to organise ‘the’ global 
history of international law, but rather that global historical approaches should be 
taken ‘seriously’ as inspirations for the authors.25 What the editors called a 
                                                 
21   See further G. R. Painter, ‘A Letter from the Haudenosaunee Confederacy to King George 
V: Writing and Reading Jurisdictions in International Legal History’, (2017) 5 London 
Review of International Law 7. 
22   J. Hohmann and D. Joyce (eds.), International Law’s Objects (forthcoming 2018); M. 
Fakhri, Sugar and the Making of International Trade Law (2014); C. N. Warren, Literature 
and the Law of Nations, 1580–1680 (2015); L. Eslava, Local Space, Global Life: The 
Everyday Operation of International Law and Development (2015); Otomo, supra note 15. 
23   See especially Benton and Ford, supra note 15, at 20–21, which looks away from jurists and 
lawyers alone towards ‘middling’ colonial bureaucrats, rebels, merchants and imperial 
commissions as central actors in processes of (international) legal, as well as imperial 
change. 
24   A.-C. Martineau, ‘Overcoming Eurocentrism? Global History and the Oxford Handbook of 
the History of International Law’, (2014) 25 EJIL 329, at 330, and see at 332ff. See also R. 
Parfitt, ‘The Spectre of Sources’, (2014) 25 EJIL 297 (who also urges a radical rethinking of 
vocabulary). 
25   A. Peters and B. Fassbender, ‘Prospects and Limits of a Global History of International 
Law: A Brief Rejoinder’, (2014) 25 EJIL 337, 339. 
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sceptical reaction to global history was mostly rooted in current (that is, post-
2008 global financial crisis) critiques of globalisation26 — hinting, then, that the 
reaction was motivated by present framings and concerns, and hence veering 
close to one of history’s apparent sins: ‘presentism’. But the risks of flippant 
‘globality’, well known to historians, had already been identified by critical 
international lawyers. BS Chimni predicted these kinds of anxieties in 2007 
when he identified two tracks for globalised histories of international law: either 
a hegemonic project of promoting and normalising global capitalism through 
common understandings of the past, or an emancipatory project that looks to 
global capital’s everyday effects and resist stories of coordination, cooperation 
and rationality.27 To avoid the pernicious risk that in failing to deal well with 
structure and positionality we not only misread the past but further entrench and 
repeat these failures, a number of scholars have opted to radically displace 
European perspectives by erasing them (almost) entirely.28 
[18] A third set of anxieties revolves around movement. The central question here — 
‘how do ideas move through time?’ — perhaps encapsulates the last decade of 
work. From it arose the wide problem of the movement between disciplines: how 
should the methods of law and history relate, and is the historian’s caution about 
anachronism and presentism one that should be shared by lawyers doing 
historical work? During the milestone period, basic forms of practical genealogy 
were readily and effectively adopted.29 Following the publication of Anne 
Orford’s International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, which tracked 
changing ways of thinking about the idea of ‘international authority’ plotted 
through episodes in papal, interwar and decolonisation histories, debates over 
contextualism, genealogy, and anachronism — the movement of international 
legal ideas in time and space — flourished. Early critiques of that work 
suggested that explicit reflections on historical and sociological methods were 
problematically absent,30 and later engagements — primarily with Ian Hunter — 
                                                 
26   Ibid 340–1. 
27   B. S. Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World 
Approach’, (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law 499, 511–12. This latter strain 
is pursued in, eg, Eslava, supra note 18. 
28   Becker Lorca, supra note 15; L. Eslava, M. Fakhri and V. Nesiah (eds.), Bandung, Global 
History and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures (2017); J. P. Scarfi, The 
Hidden History of International Law in the Americas: Empire and Legal Networks (2017); 
A. Weststeijn, ‘Provincializing Grotius: International Law and Empire in a Seventeenth-
Century Malay Mirror’ in Koskenniemi, Rech and Jimenez Fonseca (2017), 21. 
29   Most notably in N. Berman, ‘In the Wake of Empire’, (1998) 14 American University 
International Law Review 1521. 
30   See C. Peevers, ‘Conducting International Authority: Hammarskjöld, the Great Powers and 
the Suez Crisis’, (2013) 1 London Review of International Law 131; J. Mowbray, 
‘International Authority, the Responsibility to Protect and the Culture of the International 
Executive’, (2013) 1 London Review of International Law 148; A. Orford, ‘On International 
Legal Method’, (2013) 1 London Review of International Law 166. And see an endorsement 
of Orford’s approach in M. Koskenniemi, ‘Histories of International Law: Significance and 
Problems for a Critical View’, (2013) 27 Temple International and Comparative Law 
Journal 215, 226ff. 
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focused on the need to cleave to (or resist) historiographical frames.31 This led to 
a wider debate around the themes, methods, and usefulness of the Cambridge 
contextualist school of intellectual history, most often and (over)broadly 
associated with Quentin Skinner.32 Orford is not the first international lawyer to 
look or respond to contextualism.33 Others have made contextualist-style 
critiques of genealogising.34 But this debate focused directly on the insights and 
methods of both law and history to consider how history might interact with and 
differ from the study of legal ideas. For Orford, whereas questions of context and 
movements in meaning are ‘of interest’ for contextualist historians, they are 
‘unavoidable’ for lawyers: ‘contextualist historians … think about concepts in 
their proper time and place — the task of international lawyers is to think about 
how concepts move across time and space.’35 That task should focus on 
movements and changes in ‘juridical thinking’, which recognises that 
international law is always inescapably linking past to present: claims about the 
meanings of concepts, language and norms hold their political or legal force 
precisely by moving across space and time, to link the past with the present, the 
specific with the universal, and so on.36 Orford also rejected taking method as a 
cumbersome frame of theoretical demands or injunctions required for ‘real’ and 
‘proper’ history.37 She instead approaches it as a wider set of theoretical 
reflections to which history, among other disciplines and perspectives, might 
usefully contribute.38 
————————— 
[19] These anxieties persist. I want to be careful about what I do and do not mean in 
using the word ‘anxiety’. I do not use it to emphasise the critical or negative 
                                                 
31   See I. Hunter, ‘Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law 
of Nature and Nations’, in S. Dorsett and I. Hunter (eds.), Law and Politics in British 
Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 11; I. Hunter, 
‘The Figure of Man and the Territorialisation of Justice in “Enlightenment” Natural Law: 
Pufendorf and Vattel’, (2013) 23 Intellectual History Review 289; A. Orford, ‘The Past as 
Law or History? The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International Law’, in M. 
Toufayan, E. Tourme-Jouannet and H Ruiz Fabri (eds.), Droit international et nouvelles 
approches sur le tiers-monde: entre repetition et renouveau (2013), 97; A. Orford, ‘On 
International Legal Method’, (2013) 1 London Review of International Law 166; Orford, 
‘International Law and the Limits of History’, supra note 1. 
32   That approach seeks to establish what an idea meant at a time and place to particular people, 
focusing on the meaning of terms at that point, and discouraging attempts to try ‘track’ 
changes in an idea over long spans of time. See especially Q. Skinner, ‘Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas’, (1969) 8 History and Theory 3. For context, see, eg, 
M. Bevir, ‘Mind and Method in the History of Ideas’, (1997) 36 History and Theory 167; K. 
Palonen, Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric (Polity Press, 2003). 
33   Nijman, supra note 15, at 7–27. 
34   See R. Lesaffer, ‘International Law and Its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love’, in 
Craven, Fitzmaurice and Vogiatzi, supra note 14, at 27, 34. 
35   Orford, ‘The Past as Law or History?’, supra note 27, at 98. 
36   See Orford, ‘On International Legal Method’, supra note 27, at 171, 175. 
37   See especially Orford, ‘International Law and the Limits of History’, supra note 1. 
38   Ibid. 
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connotations of its everyday meanings of fear, aversion, unease. Rather, I want to 
emphasise its more technical meaning of heightened stimulation and a 
concomitant lack of working through or dealing with that stimulation. We have 
now a great number of projects stimulated by questions of historical method in 
part or in full. Yet only a handful consider or make clear the working through of 
their methods. This is the lack of working through: most considerations of 
mainstream historiography and its application to guide, structure or inform 
international legal histories are brief39 or refracted,40 and the bulk of 
international legal history does not engage with historical theory at all. Even the 
engagement with the Cambridge School — by far the most thoroughgoing to 
date — has arguably not really begun in earnest, in that there are many finer 
points and other thinkers to explore beyond the broad version of Skinner and 
Hunter’s criticisms that formed the specific engagement with Orford’s work.  
[20] The more existentialist connotations of anxiety are also appropriate: the fear 
provoked by realising the freedom we have, and not knowing how to evaluate or 
choose between the many ways that we might go about delving into the pasts of 
international law. Another side of that freedom is a feeling of responsibility for 
getting it right, or, at the least, doing it well. That sort of responsibility forms a 
longstanding part of the role and office of international lawyer: the long felt need 
to care for and be responsible for the practice, content, projects and damages of 
international law.41 In looking to history, this moves us towards grappling with 
responsibility for international law’s roles in those histories: knowing that this 
work has all too often obscured, legitimated or argued for power and its abuse, 
                                                 
39   This includes historical studies which explicitly address their historiographical 
commitments: see, eg, Nijman, supra note 29; Becker Lorca, supra note 29; T. Skouteris, 
The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse (2010) (using Jacques Derrida and 
Hayden White). Theory papers considering historiography’s application to international law 
can also contain examples of brevity in dealing with historical theory directly: see, eg, P. 
Allott, ‘International Law and the Idea of History’, (1999) 1 Journal of the History of 
International Law 1; I. J. Hueck, ‘The Discipline of the History of International Law: New 
Trends and Methods on the History of International Law’, (2001) 3 Journal of the History of 
International Law 194; A. Kemmerer, ‘The Turning Aside: On International Law and Its 
History’, in R. A. Miller and R. M. Bratspies (eds.), Progress in International Law (2008), 
71; G. R. B. Galindo, ‘Force Field: On History and Theory of International Law’, (2012) 20 
Rechtsgeschichte 86; T. Skouteris, ‘Engaging History in International Law’, in J. M. 
Beneyto and D. Kennedy (eds), New Approaches to International Law: The European and 
the American Experiences (2012), 99. 
40   By ‘refracted’ I mean they engage with other theoretical traditions tied closely to questions 
of historical method: in addition to Anghie/postcolonialism noted above is Marxist historical 
theory refracted in the work of Susan Marks and the early works of B. S. Chimni, to name 
but two: see, eg, S. Marks, ‘False Contingency’, (2009) 62 Current Legal Problems 1; B. S. 
Chimni, International Law and World Order (1993), 245–56 (on historical phases of 
bourgeois international law). 
41   See, eg, J. Westlake, International Law: An Introductory Lecture (1888), 14–15 (one early 
account of personal responsibility and civilising missions); P. Alston, ‘The Myopia of the 
Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization’, (1997) 3 EJIL 435 (on the 
relations with power); A. Orford, ‘Embodying Internationalism: The Making of 
International Lawyers’, (2001) 19 Australian Yearbook of International Law 1 (on office); 
H. Charlesworth, ‘Saddam Hussein: My Part in His Downfall’, (2005) 23 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 127 (using the language of anxiety). 
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and that whatever achievements we can point to so far, it has not calmed the 
tumult of history as it seems it always promised to do. We want to condemn the 
failures, culpability and injustices wrought by people and ideas, while also trying 
to understand and explain these things in their contexts, and, on top of that, 
trying to discern new horizons and re-imaginings of how the world and its laws 
might turn out.42 We want to take up responsibility for telling international law’s 
pasts truthfully; a reckoning that seems a pre-requisite for any improvement in its 
futures.  
[21] Ultimately, what anxiety captures is a new self-awareness and self-reflexivity 
about the difficulties of history. I want to think of this as a positive and 
productive spur to action. It is good and fitting to worry about good historical 
method. It is usually easier to express qualms about how to go about historical 
work than it is to offer clear and convincing (or indeed, any) reflections on how 
to address them. It is understandable in the face of so much history, so many 
potential sources, figures, events and arguments, where the central questions of 
what to ask, how to understand something, and what the answers seem to be, are 
all radically open. Taken together, the three sets of anxieties above illustrate the 
questions we now ask about our identity when doing things with history and law, 
about defending or rejecting claims to police our methodological choices, and 
about trying to mark and preserve an area of study in which we feel comfortable, 
qualified and able to pursue our scholarly projects. 
[22] What we anxiously ponder are the perennial questions of historiography. And yet 
we remain rarely and often superficially engaged with the ways in which these 
questions have been asked, answered, rejected, critiqued, re-asked, and re-
answered by historical theorists of all stripes. This is arguably neither 
particularly surprising nor limited to scholars working on the history of 
international law, and indeed of law in general. Similarly, plenty of historians are 
thoroughly unexcited by and uninterested in questions raised by historical theory, 
preferring a more ‘practical’ conception of their work. 
[23] Yet in the case of histories of international law today it still seems a curious 
absence. The theory and practice of international law is thoroughly intertwined 
with the world of ideas and ideas about the world.43 Histories of international 
law usually contain substantial questions or explorations of theories and 
theorising. Moreover, today’s scholars of international law seem especially 
inclined towards and adept at bringing interdisciplinary insights from a range of 
fields and theoretical frames — international relations, linguistics, anthropology, 
social and political theory, the full spectrum of critical theories — to bear on 
questions of international law. Why, then, amidst the turn to history, are 
historical theorists so often absent? Why do we so often look to Walter 
Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Paul Ricoeur or Jacques Derrida — 
theorists of general importance and power — for understanding historical-
                                                 
42   See, eg, the Allotian strain of this approach to history: P. Allott, Eutopia: New Philosophy 
and New Law for a Troubled World (2016). 
43   See, eg, M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in the World of Ideas’ in J. Crawford and M. 
Koskenniemi (eds), Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012), 47. 
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theoretical aspects of international law — without (also) poring over Fernand 
Braudel, Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, Hayden White, Dominick LaCapra, 
Immanuel Wallerstein, or Reinhart Koselleck?; to raise a standard, 
unimaginative starting point and progression confined to Western, white male 
historians and historical theorists, missing the wealth beyond those narrowing 
confines. Despite the obviousness of this kind of engagement, most 
contemporary work rarely moves far beyond brief gestures to select major 
figures — chiefly Skinner and Michel Foucault — or broad catch-all labels — 
mostly contextualism (sometimes with the still too-broad descriptor 
‘Cambridge’) and global history. There have been good exceptions to this 
general trend. But the trend and the curiousness remain.  
[24] And yet, following Orford’s concerns about policing disciplines, we ought to be 
careful about how we think of disengagement as a problem, and engagement as a 
solution. I do not suggest that recent work that does not engage directly with 
historical theory is deficient, ‘unhistorical’ or shows that the history of 
international law ought to be left to ‘trained’ historians.44 While debates over 
frames, methods, archives, interpretation, purposes and perspectives in historical 
work are conducted mainly by historians, they are not the only scholars with a 
stake in or insight into them. This is why it is useful to read our current 
discussions as expressions of anxiety, rather than as problems or failures: that we 
are anxious to do good historical work, that we worry about problems that have 
clear analogues in historical theory, and that while historical theory should not be 
approached as corrective, ready-made cure for our anxieties, it is a store of ideas, 
methods, questions, interpretive tools, principles — and the disagreements and 
debates about each of these things — all of which can help us to deepen our own 
thinking. Moving beyond brief or selective delving into these works and towards 
thorough engagement — adaptation — is one way forward. 
II ADAPTATIONS45 
[25] Adaptation usually connotes practicality, purposive adoption and shedding what 
is not useful for a task at hand. This kind of basic, pragmatic engagement is not 
the kind I suggest here. Rather, adaptation should be a form of deep engagement. 
That depth comes from two steps. First, outlining the broad tenets of a 
historiographical school and considering how they might be adapted to the 
history of international law. Secondly, delving into debates, disagreements and 
later applications that have developed and finessed that approach to history, 
which helps us to clarify how a range of methodological choices might be made 
in the context of a concrete project. This view of adaptation aims, above all, to 
resist any singular, procrustean approach to historiography and its schools. It 
prevents these internally diverse schools from becoming rigid structures against 
                                                 
44   See instead Lesaffer, supra note 30. See also A. Kemmerer, ‘“We Do Not Need to Always 
Look to Westphalia ...”: A Conversation with Martti Koskenniemi and Anne Orford’, (2015) 
17 Journal of the History of International Law 1. 
45   Some of the arguments in this section are explored, albeit in an earlier, briefer form and with 
a different framing, in M. Clark, ‘A Conceptual History of Recognition in British 
International Legal Thought’ [2018] British Yearbook of International Law (forthcoming).  
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which we measure our work. Not only would a singular statement distort any 
approach to history, it would also be unhelpful for trying to identify and alleviate 
the difficulties raised by international legal history in general and the 
methodological challenges raised in specific projects. 
[26] Deep engagement need not necessarily involve lengthy, explicit adoption of 
some historiographical framework or other, or a set of rigid conditions that 
outline why a study is a ‘genuine’ example of that approach to historical work. In 
a minimal form, it might simply involve reflections, explorations or defences of 
the choices about archives, periods, interpretations, context, or framing, as a kind 
of drawing on, gesturing to, or fitting in with one or more schools of 
historiography. Certainly, historians do not tend to outline their historiographical 
commitments explicitly and exhaustively in a section entitled ‘methodology’. 
Equally, lawyers rarely exhaustively set out the approach to legal interpretation, 
or a rigid concept of law, at the outset of a study. Some works or arguments may 
warrant or require it; but even then, it often proceeds as a description of a milieu 
or mood — of more or less fitting into an approach or school of thought — rather 
than a set of strictures. That is often what historians also do: articulate methods, 
theory framings or school alignments in an introduction, defend those choices for 
the particular study, and highlight how they might differ from and build on 
previous works or other historiographical approaches already taken in the field.46 
Both fields certainly have their share of scholars who are firmly uninterested in 
questions of theory and method, preferring instead the craft or practice 
metaphors as definitions of their endeavours. But in both cases, even this 
‘minimal’ theorising belies a close appreciation of the tools, frames and methods 
of doing that work, even if it is left unsaid. For lawyers taking up historical 
questions without that training or practice, minimal description may be enough, 
but it may be more useful to err on the side of detailed exploration. 
————————— 
[27] How can we begin adapting conceptual history to international law? One starting 
point is with the already close affinity of law, history and theory, and the 
importance of concepts in writing our current histories. Many histories of 
international law could be read or redescribed as conceptual histories,47 as could 
those works more specifically dubbed as ‘genealogies’ or sitting within the wider 
                                                 
46   See, eg, Benton and Ford, supra note 15, ch 1. 
47   Some examples, from the 1930s to today, include E. D. Dickinson, ‘Changing Concepts and 
the Doctrine of Incorporation’, (1932) 26 AJIL 239; C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in 
the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (2003); C. Ku, ‘The Concept of Res 
Communis in International Law’, (1990) 12 History of European Ideas 459; A. Carty, 
‘Myths of International Legal Order: Past and Present’, (1997) 10 Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 3 (using concepts of ‘myth’, ‘frontier’ and ‘territory’); E. Benvenisti, 
‘The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation’, (2008) 26 Law and History Review 
621. Schmitt’s Nomos is perhaps the clearest example, and Schmitt’s influence on Koselleck 
forms an important basis for Koselleck’s vision of politics (and history) as a field of combat 
between groups over and through ideas: see N. Olsen, ‘Carl Schmitt, Reinhart Koselleck and 
the Foundations of History and Politics’, (2011) 37 History of European Ideas 197. 
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turn to the ‘international’ in intellectual history.48 Despite this connection, this 
ease of redescription, and the general aversion to historiography explored above, 
it is still surprising that one major trend in twentieth century historiography — 
‘conceptual history’, treated almost synonymously with one of its major 
primogenitors, Reinhart Koselleck49 — has received at best fleeting notice as a 
possible pathway for international legal historiography. In 2012, Koskenniemi 
provided a short and enticing exploration of those possibilities, seeing 
Koselleck’s work as a way of highlighting the polemical sides of the vocabulary 
of international legal argument, which could frame connections between 
doctrinal arguments and their political, confrontational projects, and ultimately 
ground new histories of international law that narrate the clash of legal views as 
‘an aspect of political struggle’.50 More recently, Craven used Koselleck’s 
explanations of the origins of historiography and the emergence of historical 
time as a frame for the development of international legal history.51 Other works 
have used the language of ‘polemic’ or ‘combat’ concepts52 — very 
Koselleckian terms — or embrace the breadth of conceptual history, often with 
                                                 
48   Examples of the former include, eg, Berman, ‘In the Wake of Empire’, supra note 25; R. G. 
Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’, (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69; A. 
Rasulov, ‘New Approaches to International Law: Images of a Genealogy’, in Beneyto and 
Kennedy (2012), 151. For the intellectual history turn to the international, see, eg, D. 
Armitage, ‘The International Turn in Intellectual History’, in D. M. McMahon and S. Moyn 
(eds.), Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History (2014), 232. Indeed, Armitage 
himself provides strong examples of recent major conceptual histories grounded in law and 
the international: see, eg, Armitage, Civil Wars, supra note 15. 
49   The major essay collections translated into English are R. Koselleck, Futures Past: On the 
Semantics of Historical Time (1985); R. Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: 
Timing History, Spacing Concepts (2002). On the development of conceptual history, see, 
eg, M. Richter, ‘Conceptual History (Begriffsgeschichte) and Political Theory’, (1986) 14 
Political Theory 604; M Richter, ‘Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas’, (1987) 48 
Journal of the History of Ideas 247. The major, multi-volume ‘encyclopedia’ of conceptual 
histories is O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: 
Historisches Lexikon Zur Politisch-Sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (1972–97). Two 
entries translated into English are: F.-L. Knemeyer, ‘Polizei’, (1980) 9 Economy and Society 
172; R. Walther, ‘Economic Liberalism’, (1984) 13 Economy and Society 178. On 
Koselleck’s life and work, see, eg, N. Olsen, History in the Plural: An Introduction to the 
Work of Reinhart Koselleck (2012); M. Richter, The History of Political and Social 
Concepts: A Critical Introduction (1995). 
50   M. Koskenniemi, ‘A History of International Law Histories’, in Fassbender and Peters, 
supra note 15, 943, at 968–9. 
51   M. Craven, ‘Theorising the Turn to History in International Law’ in Anne Orford and 
Florian Hoffmann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (2016), 
21. 
52   See T. Hippler and M. Vec, ‘Peace as a Polemic Concept: Writing the History of Peace in 
Nineteenth Century Europe’, in T. Hippler and M. Vec (eds.), Paradoxes of Peace in 
Nineteenth Century Europe (2015), 1; I. Hunter, ‘About the Dialectical Historiography of 
International Law’, (2016) 1 Global Intellectual History 1. While Hunter does not explicitly 
cite Koselleck here, his earlier works were strongly influenced by Koselleck as well as 
Schmitt: see I. Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early 
Modern Europe (2006), 11–12. 
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scattered references to Koselleck’s works.53 One project promises an 
encyclopedia of fundamental international legal concepts, many of which are 
explained largely through their history, and which may prove to mimic the 
foundational multi-volume collection of conceptual histories, the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe.54  
[28] These are all useful provocations moving in the right direction. But they are not 
examples of deep engagement with the methods and frames of conceptual 
history. This part explores the tenets, debates and possibilities of conceptual 
history in more depth, to think on how they might be adapted. It outlines 
conceptual history under the rubric of the main anxieties outlined above — 
materials, context and movements — presenting its main tenets as contained in 
the works of Koselleck, as well as a handful of contemporary extensions, debates 
and applications. It then synthesises this account into general insights for 
conceptual histories of international law. Finally, it outlines one set of 
methodological choices made in a concrete project on the history of the concept 
of recognition.  
————————— 
[29] First, how does conceptual history approach and order its sources? The principal 
sources are the works of ‘representative authors’. This begins with ‘classical’ 
thinkers — philosophers, theologians, poets, economists, legal and political 
theorists — who considered, debated or introduced new versions of ideas, 
proposed visions of the world, and promoted or critiqued ideologies. Examining 
these texts establishes the ‘semantic fields’ of a period: the conditions of 
possibility about what can be said, argued, understood and done at a particular 
time. We then turn to wider sources that might contain social and political 
debates using the concept examined: newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, 
parliamentary debates, government sources, diaries, letters, and, to some extent, 
dictionaries and encyclopedias.55 Understanding a concept’s impact in the world 
and its formation and change is largely gleaned from comparing and contrasting 
uses between and within these categories of sources.56 In Koselleck’s original 
approach, these sources and examinations must be confined to singular national-
linguistic traditions and political communities. That is because although 
conceptual history looks to a wide range of actors and forms of communications, 
the terms used — and hence their past uses — must be largely similar and 
shared. Apparently similar translated terms (for example, state, état, Rechtstaat) 
hold vastly different meanings, connotations and uses, rooted in their varied 
                                                 
53   D. Grimm, Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept (2015) 
(discussing Koselleck briefly at 104). 
54   J. D’Aspremont and S. Singh (eds.), Fundamental Concepts for International Law: 
Construction of a Discipline (forthcoming 2018). 
55   On sources, see R. Koselleck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces to the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe’, (2011) 6(1) Contributions to the History of Concepts 1, at 22–3. 
56   Ibid 22. See also R. Koselleck, ‘Begriffsgeschichte and Social History’, (1982) 11 Economy 
and Society 409, at 415. 
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histories within national-linguistic communities.57 Recent works have sought to 
expand this national-linguistic-centred approach, thinking through the translation 
of concepts across languages58 and the comparative, transnational and global 
dimensions of language.59   
[30] Secondly, what broad contexts are relevant? Conceptual histories are sometimes 
dubbed ‘pragmatic’ in their linking of language, ideas and the context of a 
period, specifically its intellectual and social history.60 While changes in political 
and social situations are often presented in relatively general terms, changes in 
language, arguments and ideas should be situated within these broader 
transformations. Context is not just a background to concepts. It can also 
condition their possible meanings, and — most importantly — the kinds of 
political projects or views of the world that a concept can be used to describe or 
advocate for at a given point in time.61 Koselleck’s approach involved several 
stringent principles about where and how the engagement with context should 
take place. Conceptual history should neither try to draw conclusions about 
historical facts directly from linguistic sources, nor focus only on ‘intellectual 
expressions’ of earlier thinkers.62 Rather, it seeks to understand how concepts 
were ‘used in the past to order experience’.63 Those ordering concepts can then 
form the basis for theorising the world or society, eventually becoming central 
parts of political or ideological arguments, which can then be examined 
thematically for changes in them over time.64 The concrete ‘facts’ of history and 
the language of the times play important roles, and their relevance is prompted 
when a concept uses, shapes or is shaped by them, illustrated by changes to its 
content.65 A distinction between historical facts and language use must be 
maintained to ensure that the inquiry does not lead to only factual history, or 
simply a catalogue of a language’s use of political and social terms.66 
Contemporary works have sought, in various ways, to globalise both language 
and context, to move beyond the nation-state and largely European focus of 
                                                 
57   On this point, illustrated with reference to French, British and German understandings of 
voting rights since the French Revolution, see R. Koselleck, ‘Linguistic Change and the 
History of Events’, (1989) 61 Journal of Modern History 649, at 657–61. 
58   See, eg, M. J. Burke and M. Richter (eds.), Why Concepts Matter: Translating Social and 
Political Thought (2012). 
59   See, eg, P. den Boer, ‘Towards a Comparative History of Concepts: Civilisation and 
“Beschaving”’, (2007) 3 Contributions to the History of Concepts 207. 
60   J.-W. Müller, ‘On Conceptual History’, in D. M. McMahon and S. Moyn (eds.), Rethinking 
Modern European Intellectual History (2014), 74, at 74 (and noting that this pragmatism is 
reflected in the ‘somewhat paradoxical’ lack of any ‘real theory’ of Koselleck’s approach 
itself). 
61   Koselleck, ‘Begriffsgeschichte and Social History’, supra note 52, at 419. 
62   Koselleck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces’, supra note 51, at 21. 
63   Ibid. 
64   Ibid. 
65   Ibid 28. 
66   Ibid 29. 
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Koselleckian conceptual histories.67 Even where Europe remains the focus, 
recent work shows careful appreciation of the importance of non-European 
contexts and influences for understanding conceptual change taking place in 
European discourses.68 
[31] Third, how do concepts move in conceptual history? Koselleckian conceptual 
history fixes on a concept, charting its emergence as a ‘basic concept’ over 
time.69 ‘Basicness’ is a complicated idea, but includes those ideas that are 
essential and contested: ideas that are ever-present, invoked by all political 
actors, indispensable for furthering political projects, and used so often that they 
crystallise into single words or terms: ‘state’, ‘human right’, ‘democracy’.70 A 
conceptual history framework plots the transition to this ‘basicness’ by charting 
where, when, how and why different associations, connotations and strands of 
meaning are added to, endure in, or are discarded from a concept.71 Addressing 
the accumulated criticisms of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Koselleck 
clarified that when a concept is placed in historical context, it can be called 
‘basic’ ‘if and when all contesting strata and parties find it indispensable to 
expressing their distinctive experiences, interests, and party-political 
programs’.72 This moment of transition is indicated by a concept coming to 
‘dominate usage’, a starting point of  ‘minimum commonalities’ in meanings of a 
concept that are necessary for it convey and contest social and political 
experiences and programs; more simply, the commonality of language needed 
for political discourse — and hence action — at all.73 Movement in conceptual 
history takes place within a particular conception of time. A first step is 
uncovering the possibilities of what can be thought, said, and done, at various 
points in time.74 The transition from tradition to modernity — a movement to 
basicness — is not a simple ‘before’ and ‘after’ teleology. Instead, it is a gradual 
shift where a concept takes on a temporal aspect, where it can be used to describe 
                                                 
67   See, eg, A. Lianeri, ‘A Regime of Untranslatables: Temporalities of Translation and 
Conceptual History’, (2014) 53 History and Theory 473; S. Moyn and A. Sartori (eds.), 
Global Intellectual History (2014); H. Schulz-Forberg, ‘The Spatial and Temporal Layers of 
Global History A Reflection on Global Conceptual History through Expanding Reinhart 
Koselleck’s Zeitschichten into Global Spaces’, (2013) 38(3) Historical Social 
Research/Historische Sozialforschung 40. 
68   See further W. Steinmetz, M. Freeden and J. Fernández Sebastián (eds.), Conceptual 
History in the European Space (2017). 
69   R. Koselleck, ‘A Response to Comments on the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe’, in H. 
Lehmann and M. Richter (eds.), The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New 
Studies on Begriffsgeschichte (1996), 59, at 64. See also E. J. Palti, ‘Reinhart Koselleck: His 
Concept of the Concept and Neo-Kantianism’, (2011) 6(2) Contributions to the History of 
Concepts 1. 
70   Müller, supra note 56, at 84. 
71   Koselleck, ‘A Response’, supra note 65, at 68. 
72   Koselleck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces’, supra note 51, at 32. 
73   Ibid. 
74   See J. Rayner, ‘On Begriffsgeschichte Again’, (1990) 18 Political Theory 305, at 306. 
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possible futures, and advocate for one or another of those futures.75 In 
Koselleck’s work, this transition period — the Sattelzeit or ‘saddle time’ — is 
the period during which most concepts underwent this change. For Koselleck, it 
is posited as approximately 1750–1850, but other projects have stretched further 
backwards and forwards in their periodizations,76 and later commentators have 
seen the Sattelzeit as any transition period that stretches continuities and 
discontinuities to the present.77 Within this transition, concepts become 
‘essentially utopian’: they could do more than just describe the conditions of the 
world; they begin to identify conditions that should change and prescribe action 
to achieve those changes. Somewhat paradoxically, during this transition, 
interlocutors are forever trying to fix an exclusive, singular meaning to a 
concept; to present it as a universal, atemporal, coherent, and univocal idea. But 
because the meanings and uses of concepts are constantly in flux, responding to 
and shaping societies, and finding different uses in political arguments, these 
concepts — even, or especially, when presented as definite — remain always 
contested, ambiguous and controversial.78 Their continuities and ruptures within 
these arguments indicate their changes and movements.  
[32] Perhaps the best shorthand description of conceptual movement is into four 
‘hypotheses’. Prompted by critical discussions over the lack of clarity in 
Koselleck’s work, these hypotheses neatly distil conceptual historical 
investigation itself.79 In their hypothesis form, they are built from the general 
trends seen in specific conceptual histories in the GG. But for the purpose of 
adaptation, they can be easily repurposed into hypothetical questions. The first is 
temporalisation: when is a concept placed into a longer horizon of a particular 
philosophical or historical development, or into a teleology of stages of 
development? The second is democratisation: when is a concept’s audiences 
expanded beyond small elite political strata to the larger body politic? The third 
is ideologization: when does a concept gain the ability to be incorporated into 
ideologies; when is it picked up by various social strata and moved into ‘isms’ 
and singular nouns (‘liberalism’, ‘liberty’) for use in politics? The fourth is 
politicisation: when does a concept begin to be used by antagonistic political 
                                                 
75   On which, see Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History, supra note 45, chs 7 
(‘Concepts of Historical Time and Social History’) and 10 (‘The Eighteenth Century as the 
Beginning of Modernity’). 
76   See, eg, the wide range of periods explored in the essays in P. Ihalainen, C. Ilie and K. 
Palonen (eds.), Parliaments and Parliamentarism: A Comparative History of a European 
Concept (2016). 
77   See further G. Motzkin, ‘On the Notion of Historical (Dis)Continuity: Koselleck’s 
Construction of the Sattelzeit’, (2005) 1(2) Contributions to the History of Concepts 145. 
78   See K. Palonen, ‘An Application of Conceptual History to Itself: From Method to Theory in 
Reinhart Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte’, (1997) 1 Redescriptions 39, at 41–2 and 65. 
79   These distillations can be seen in, eg, M. Richter, ‘Appreciating a Contemporary Classic: 
The Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe and Future Scholarship’, (1997) 1 Finnish Yearbook of 
Political Thought 25, at 28–30; P. den Boer, ‘The Historiography of German 
Begriffsgeschichte and the Dutch Project of Conceptual History’ in I. Hampsher-Monk, K. 
Tilmans and F. van Vree (eds.), History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives (1998), 13, 
at 15. 
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actors to advance their projects during rearrangements of social, regional and 
national connections driven by revolutions, wars and economic changes. These 
question are phrased as ‘when’ inquiries; after that answer comes the questions 
of who, how, why, and with what effects? 
————————— 
[33] These hypothetical questions can be usefully adapted to guide histories of 
international legal concepts. We might ask instead: when might an international 
legal concept be placed into wider philosophical, historical or teleological 
narratives? When might it gain wider speakers and audiences beyond just the 
elite strata of jurists and state leaders? When might it be generalised or 
abstracted and then fitted into ideologies espoused by particular states or groups? 
And when might it become practical or usable for states or groups in articulating 
and pursuing political projects amidst the torrents of world history? Again, after 
identifying the when, we may move to the who, how, why, and with what effect. 
We may also see fit to build in new hypotheses specific to international law. One 
important example might be universalisation or internationalisation: when and 
how does a concept begin to be used to make demands across borders, or posed 
as asking or attaining the assent of all nations or peoples?80 Another could be 
legalisation or juridification: where and how do ordinarily or formerly ‘political’ 
concepts become juridified; that is, described and defended as matters of law and 
not politics, and with what effects? 
[34] Consistent with conceptual history’s focus, histories of international legal 
concepts should look to identify the emergence of ‘basic concepts’ in 
international legal thought and practice. Basic concepts in international law, like 
basic concepts in general, would be those terms that are essentially contested and 
controversial but are simultaneously central to articulating arguments, positions 
or projects in international law.81 A starting list could be generated from the 
headings of any major textbook — ‘sources’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘treaty’, 
‘international court’, ‘general principles’, ‘human rights’ — to which could be 
added major themes and contested ideas: ‘civilisation’, ‘progress’, ‘empire’, 
‘authority’, ‘protection’, ‘jurisdiction’, ‘comity’, ‘community’, ‘war’, ‘peace’. 
Technical concepts or major doctrinal debates could also, potentially, achieve the 
level of basicness: ‘competence’, ‘non-refoulement’, ‘monism’. 
[35] During the general period of transition from traditional to modern concepts, 
international lawyers were engaged in forging a professional identity with its 
own scientific, technical and expert vocabulary. The ‘representative authors’ 
may include writers from philosophers to theologians, but jurists and juristic 
works that describe, theorise, debate and apply concepts in international law are 
likely to contain the bulk of conceptual discussion and change. The limits of this 
professional vocabulary and its comparatively few interlocutors pose problems 
for source selection; namely, where to widen out the texts and debates that reflect 
conceptual changes in the world? One avenue is expanding the field of 
                                                 
80   As applied to global intellectual history, see further C. L. Hill, ‘Conceptual Universalization 
in the Transnational Nineteenth Century’ in Moyn and Sartori (eds), supra note 63, 134. 
81   Koselleck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces’, supra note 51, at 3. 
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interlocutors from jurists, judges and practitioners to also encompass those 
reading, acting and relying on legal advice in public discussions — state leaders, 
government officials, international bureaucrats, leaders of social movements — 
as well as thinkers in other disciplines who are taken up by or come to influence 
jurists. The latter group may be a source of wider conceptual changes in social 
and political concepts that come to be incorporated, reflected (or rejected) in 
changes in law and legal theory. More generally, engaging with the histories of a 
wide variety of closely linked political, social and economic concepts to 
understand the boundaries of what is thinkable and expressible in legal argument 
is likely to be just as important as exploring the internal limits of legal discourse. 
Finally, and most closely aligned with general conceptual history, the moments 
when international legal concepts gain popular understandings and political 
deployments in wider civil society discussions — consider the popular discourse 
on the use of force and the Iraq War,82 or everyday discussions of the work of 
the International Criminal Court in African nations83 — may prove to be the 
most important sites for shifts in meaning. 
[36] A second source problem is translation and nationality. Translation and 
comparison of similar concepts across jurisdictions and legal languages seem 
almost a necessity for histories of international legal concepts. Cross-national 
and cross-regional conversations are common and important for the development 
of international law, and are the site for the furthering of political projects. It is 
important, however, not to dispose of the national-linguistic focus of 
Koselleckian conceptual history too hastily. While the texts and projects of 
international lawyers are designed to have effects across borders, into the states 
and societies of other polities or towards and international community in general, 
they are often rooted in national legal languages and cultures and support 
national foreign policies. Situating international legal arguments in their national 
traditions may clarify points of transnational contention and disagreement, but 
they may also highlight more local shifts in the meaning of concepts. Many 
central building blocks of legal thought hold meanings and connotations specific 
to various legal cultures: consider the widely different meanings of terms for 
law, right, justice, adjudication, constitution, state, international law, even within 
European traditions.84 How and where these different conceptions encounter 
each other, beyond the confines of the nation, cannot be ignored, as they largely 
can in nation-focused conceptual history. Certainly, the dissemination, 
incorporation or resistance to ‘foreign’ legal ideas will be one site of this 
engagement. Juristic texts themselves have different forms, levels of authority, 
audiences and impact on practice depending on the culture. Finally, whereas 
groups seeking to use concepts for (domestic) political ends are a major focus for 
general conceptual history, the relevant political projects here are likely to be 
                                                 
82   See, eg, C. Peevers, The Politics of Justifying Force: The Suez Crisis, the Iraq War, and 
International Law (2013). 
83   See, eg, S. M. H. Nouwen, ‘“As You Set out for Ithaka”: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical 
and Existential Questions about Socio-Legal Empirical Research in Conflict’, (2014) 27 
LJIL 227. 
84   See further A. Roberts, Is International Law International? (2017). 
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primarily those tied to visions of international — rather than domestic — society: 
debates over interventions, legal systems, the appraisal or criticism of particular 
forms of government, the projects of colonial expansion and control, and the role 
of Great Powers and international coordination in furthering or curtailing these 
kinds of projects are the sorts of political agendas that are relevant here. And yet 
‘domestic’ forms of political concepts and ideologies as developed in different 
nations will, however, remain important, as they so often form the models to be 
projected and imposed on to international society, as was the idea of Europe. 
[37] Because international law holds relevance in so many historical events and so 
many forms of life and action, the array of factual contexts that might seem 
necessary or at least useful for understanding its concepts is immense. One mode 
of narrowing down that breadth is to begin with unpacking the contexts that an 
author has selected or lived through, to ask which events or trends are invoked, 
to what end (as historical illustration; as a current dilemma; as an analogy or 
distinguishable case?), and which are ignored? Which contemporary problems is 
the text aimed at addressing, illuminating, or criticising? The contexts for placing 
these texts are those of their authors (personal, intellectual, political), the projects 
and visions of international law and society these texts describe or promote, and 
the concrete factual events that they are shaped by or seek to interpret or 
influence: diplomatic interactions, disputes, wars, treaties, trade, congresses, 
imperialism, colonialism, and so on. As with general conceptual history, paying 
attention to the way formulations of concepts might press on interpreting the 
facts of the world is vital: concepts affect the portrayal of context just as much as 
language and that world may shape concepts themselves. 
[38] Finally, examining movement in international legal concepts means paying close 
attention to juristic texts as the main sites of likely conceptual change, but to be 
read and contextualised in their wider worlds. As with general conceptual 
history, the movements we should look for are stability in meanings and 
connotations over time, changes recognisable at specific times, and the accretion 
and discarding of meaning likely seen in doctrinal endorsements, modifications, 
disagreements or criticisms. These movements may be divided into sub-periods 
which might emphasise the rise or fall of particular understandings or 
applications of a concept, or shifts in their use in political projects. These various 
trends may well overlap substantially. The central question remains what kinds 
of meanings and projects were — or seemed — thinkable and realisable within 
the boundaries of law and legal ideas at the time, and how did these texts expand 
those meanings or further those projects.  
————————— 
[39] A recently published conceptual history of recognition provides a concrete 
example of how these historiographical considerations might play out.85 
‘Recognition’ is, today, perhaps the clearest example of a basic concept in 
international law. Academically, it is usually explained as a diametric opposition 
of constitutivist and declarativist theories. Politically, it almost always forms a 
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moment and space of wide, contentious and acrimonious argument that deploy 
competing factual, political and ideological claims which are quickly cloaked in 
the language of law. For this reason, it is more easily accepted as holding 
important political dimensions, at least compared to other more traditionally 
‘legal’ concepts in international law.  
[40] The history I told presented one ‘British story’ of recognition. It examined the 
juristic works of international lawyers writing in Britain as well as their political 
and social projects and contexts to show how different meanings of recognition 
emerged and formed a ground for contestation over law, empire and the shape of 
the world. In the nineteenth century, recognition began as a descriptive, 
European-diplomatic concept, before being refashioned as the basis for 
chauvinist theories of international law, and then more broadly use as a 
racialized language that furthered colonial and imperial projects. In the twentieth 
century, jurists began to shed the language of civilisation from the meaning of 
recognition, which gave way to widely divergent political and utopian projects 
amidst the new international system of the League of Nations. By the 1950s, 
recognition had emerged as a basic concept — essentially contested and 
inescapable — amid the ruins of the British Empire, the establishment of the 
United Nations, and the turn towards decolonisation and self-determination.  
[41] The materials for this history were a wide range of juristic texts published over 
two centuries. Its contexts were the political and social projects of these jurists, 
as well as changes in Britain, its empire, and the world. The movements were 
those of the concept of recognition, as well as these contexts, which split into 
several strands that partly overlapped to reflect the concurrence and contestation 
of these ideas. These choices were made in line with the tenets on adaptation 
outlined above. They balanced continuity and connection against change and 
diversity. The continuities and connections lay in the focus on a concept 
encapsulated in one unchanging word, in similar writing styles, social situations, 
worldviews, and a geographical and political connection around ‘Britain’ and its 
empire. The change and diversity came from the different projects and purposes 
to which recognition was put, and the changes of contest in Britain, its empire 
and the world. It picked up a tradition of legal thought and practice that is 
recognisably ‘British’ and yet still complex, contested and largely incapable of 
clear definition. In many senses, this is an immensely conservative frame: around 
published texts of white male legal scholars, largely upper-class, most holding 
university chairs, all but one Christian, working in and thinking about one of the 
world’s most powerful, long-lived imperial polities. But in going back to these 
texts and figures carefully, with the insights of conceptual history in mind, we 
can see anew just how and where the assumptions about race, power and 
authority came to be entwined in the idea of recognition. It is not to promote 
these figures as the only writers worth looking at. But nor does it demand we re-
write their works or judge them by today’s standards, as some — critical or not 
— have worried.86 Their problematic aspects lie on the surfaces of their writings. 
Those aspects are not only occasions for judgment, but also guides to why and 
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how we ended up as we did; how the ideas that we might abhor today were 
moved into the sediment of international legal thought. We follow the leads to 
who has been said to have invented these things, invoked them, shaped them, but 
in doing so we need not necessary write ‘to’ them,87 taking the risk of 
reinscribing them further. 
[42] My choices in this project could have been made differently. Its sources might 
have placed greater weight on public debates using the language of recognition. 
Two clear examples were, first, the 1820s campaigns by London merchants for 
British recognition of the Spanish Republics which led to Sir James 
Mackintosh’s policy shift and, secondly, letters to newspapers from an enthralled 
public about recognition and the American Civil War that prompted the 
publication of Montague Bernard’s letters explaining recognition to readers of 
The Times. These, among many other instances, might have led to a more public 
discourse focused project. Another approach might have emphasised 
parliamentary debates and committee reports, or judicial decisions and their 
wider reception, or shifting concepts deployed within the Foreign Office. A 
larger temporal frame might have opened up earlier contexts of papal 
interventions or recognition’s possible proto-concepts, like legitimacy, 
jurisdiction or authority, which might have been sourced in ancient forbears in 
Rome or Greece. Within its own timeframe, it could have more keenly explored 
debates about revolution and recognition in relation to America or France held in 
more political than legal tones. A more ambitious, transnational frame could 
have incorporated other Anglophone writers throughout British settler colonies, 
or looked to French, Spanish, German or Russian writings, or canvassed 
recognition’s great importance in Central and South America. Beyond Europe, 
the history might have engaged with recognition’s place — or absence — in 
Third World legal thought; in the theories and practices of political and social 
movements throughout the British Empire in the long marches to independence, 
or the interventions and engagements against the Ottoman, Japanese and Chinese 
Empires. Looking to the post-war changes in the concept, and the rise of other 
competing ways of thinking about state legitimacy and subjecthood — self-
determination, later democracy — could have allowed the tracing of other 
legacies in recognition’s possible newer guises and transformations.  
[43] This is part self-criticism and part wishful thinking. The above project was but 
one starting point. It could not canvass all the possibilities noted above and 
explore every path that might have been illuminating. It was ‘a’ conceptual 
history, focused on one small, significant part of a global debate on an issue of 
old, perennial importance, not ‘the’ definitive account. Consciously noting these 
other possible methodological choices reinforces that conceptual history offered 
a powerful scaffold for thinking through why and how the choices in this project 
were made. It provided a set of tools for deciding on sources and contexts and for 
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thinking about conceptual movement. Ultimately, this interrogation shows the 
promise — and the difficulty and complexity — of constructing conceptual 
histories, even those confined to a single state and a standard length of about two 
centuries. It also allows us to begin thinking about what might be gained by 
looking to other schools of historiography. 
III ADVANCES 
[44] The adaptation explored above shows several directions for advances. It provides 
us with an approach to texts and contexts that can avoid the rigidity of a 
simplistic focus on doctrine that anxiety around texts seeks to address, and 
guides us in delving into the detail of ideas and contexts without becoming lost 
within them. It structures our inquiries into a broad range of thinkers and texts to 
examine the development of concepts that remains tied to context, national 
understandings and political projects. It also allows us the creativity to think 
beyond just attempting to prove specific causal claims about influence, reception 
and impact by emphasising wider uses of language, general social and political 
projects, and the ways in which concepts illustrate changes in the world. It helps 
us avoid the narrowness that contextualism can tend towards. It forces us to think 
about where particular ideas in international law are situated between their 
immediate context and the free-floating play of academic ideas, as well as giving 
us a set of tools to help navigate that placement. It also gives us a means of 
confining the totality of world events that might have impacted international 
legal concepts.  
[45] In more practical terms, this kind of engagement can be the basis for 
institutional, interdisciplinary and collaborative research projects with the many 
other scholars that form the contemporary renaissance of conceptual historical 
work. A decade ago, Kari Palonen noted that conceptual history’s focus on the 
politics of questions, rather than those of answers, provides one promise for 
engagement with public debate and discourse that fits into the contemporary 
milieu of academic research in the neoliberal university and state.88 But it is also 
one way of pushing back against the problematic aspects of that institutional 
setting, at this moment of social and political tumult: to chart how questions and 
debates always held pragmatic relationships to truth, justice, law and power, to 
show how they deployed concepts and descriptions of the world for combative 
purposes which continue to shape our present visions. Our wider anxieties and 
ambivalences — the everyday, social and political ones — have long histories 
too. 
————————— 
[46] History is neither synonymous with the past, nor a singular truth about the past. 
Instead it involves claims and arguments about how to understand the past that 
might be more or less convincing but are always open to contestation. Like the 
study of law, history is an unending examination of questions of authority, 
legitimacy, truth and meaning. It proceeds by crafting narratives, making claims 
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about a general explanation or significance, illustrated and finessed by the 
consideration of the particular. It improves by re-evaluating those narratives, 
incorporating new materials, ideas and ways of understanding the world that 
were previously ignored or hidden. Just as lawyers are frequently and wrongly 
perceived to have special and exclusive access to the realm of legal arguments, 
historians are not blessed with special or exclusive access to the past. What is 
common to both disciplines is the importance of specialised training in kinds of 
argumentation that, following reflection and exercise of that training, can build 
understanding and good scholarship. International lawyers are as free as anyone 
else to understand and interpret the history of their discipline and the world in 
which it is situated,89 and for some topics technical legal training may prove 
more important than historical training. We ought to be humble about our 
abilities and attempts in trying to write histories of international law. Historians 
likewise ought to be humble about their own limits in navigating law and legal 
argumentation. One of adaptation’s most important advances is in its invitation 
to a productive kind of humility. Doing good interdisciplinary work always 
involves ambivalence, anxiety, adaptation, as a means to — hopefully — some 
advancement in understanding and knowledge; and the best scholarship always 
mixes brashness and humility in appropriate measures. But to clarify where the 
blind spots lie for both disciplines, and to fix or at least understand them better 
— to balm our anxieties — we ought to engage with historiography. 
[47] This article has contributed an exploration of one small but important part of the 
wider historiographical landscape around which engagement might take place. I 
pursued here the adaptation of only one school of history that focuses on thought 
over time, and with a relatively narrow focus. Not only do we need to hold on to 
the plurality internal to that school, but we need to also explore the many 
historical theories that may lead us towards very different ways of writing the 
history of international law. Hopefully, ultimately, a more thoroughgoing set of 
adaptations would map the diversity of that landscape. This is true, firstly, of the 
many strands of historical work that deal with thought and time in ways other 
than conceptual history: intellectual history, the history of political thought, 
genealogy, and older schools of the history of ideas, and so on. It also applies to 
wider trends in historiography not primarily focused on ideas: more detailed 
explorations of social, Marxist, feminist, postcolonial, micro- and global 
historiography, for a start, would add further richness to our methodological 
palette. And while I urge a thorough engagement with ‘mainstream’ 
historiography, it is important not to forget that theorising about legal history — 
particularly its transnational, comparative and global angles — offers another 
rich vein of materials for international law that has likewise remained 
                                                 
89   A. Carty, ‘Visions of the Past of International Society: Law, History or Politics?’, (2006) 69 
Modern Law Review 644, at 656. 
 Advances 27 
untapped.90 For those concerned about international legal history’s narrow focus 
on ideas,91 looking to objects, materiality, social movements, institutions, 
governance and the everyday life of international law are all exciting avenues 
that these historiographical schools can help pave. Care about the narrowness of 
a focus on jurists or ideas is understandable; but one way of avoiding narrowness 
is to radically widen the ways in which we can think about ideas over time. 
[48] But in building that palette, we ought to recall that adaptation should not take 
these schools or thinkers as singular or rigid frames. They are encountered as 
disputed, multifaceted ways of thinking about and doing historical work, that 
cannot be reified as ‘solutions’ to our anxieties about method, but as material to 
understand those questions in more detail to begin finding answers of our own. 
Adaptation means taking up and thinking with whatever strikes us as 
illuminating for the project at hand. And it means continuing the very fruitful 
connections recently forged with historians of a variety of schools around 
questions of the pasts of international laws and politics.  
[49] This might all sound somewhat exhausting, and in the face of an ambitious 
agenda we might risk slipping back to ambivalence about historical method. For 
some, moving away from conversations about method — thinking about what 
comes after method — is the more productive step.92 But before we decide to do 
so, it is worth attempting a more thoroughgoing engagement with possibilities of 
historiography. Koselleck and conceptual history offers one new vista. 
Deepening and expanding that engagement may allow us to realise the 
usefulness of a wide range of contending approaches to historical theory, 
ultimately helping us articulate the different frames, accounts and starting points 
that will allow us to write new and better — and potentially, eventually, radically 
different — histories of international law. 
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